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BOOK REVIEWS
CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE. By Barbara Hinkson Craig.' New
York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 262. $24.95.
Frank J. Sorauf 2
No other part of the constitutional system seems as deeply set
in the American consciousness as the separation of powers. Because millions of Americans easily remember its tripartite nature
and its enveloping system of checks and balances, it has become a
bedrock of our civic culture. No matter that those famous checks
and balances do not capture the realities of the struggles among the
three branches in the late twentieth century. The realities are messy
and indeterminate, for the branches' boundaries are indistinct and
their relations feature accommodation as well as conflict. Reality
aside, however, the neat simplicity of the formal view makes it easy
to grasp and easy to honor as immutable truth.
That false simplicity has bedeviled the doctrine of the separation from the very beginning. It was conceived in Montesquieu's
understanding of evolving English institutions-one might say in
his imposing a very French order, balance, and precision where
none in fact existed. Among the constitution makers of the late
eighteenth century, the separation satisfied the yearning for scientific laws with which to design good and effective government. Our
Constitution's framers were typical of their era in their pursuit of
the "divine science of politics," as John Adams called it. What
could have been more rewarding in that search for the laws of good
government than the discovery of a system of forces and
counterforces that held the three branches in a Newtonian equilibrium? So from the beginning the separation was framed in a
mechanical simplicity and law-like certainty.
Partly mythical though it was, the separation was at the very
core of the institutional arrangements of the Constitution. It is not
surprising that from time to time it has surfaced as an issue of constitutional debate. That was certainly so in the 1930s when acts of
I.
2.
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Congress delegating "legislative" power to administrative agencies
were struck down by the Supreme Court, and in these last few decades the separation has reemerged as a major constitutional issue.
Professor Barbara Hinkson Craig's full-length study of Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha documents one of the major
landmarks in that reemergence, for it was in Chadha that the
Supreme Court abruptly ended Congress's increasing reliance on
"legislative vetoes" over the rules and decisions of executive
agencies.
Professor Craig merges her study of the demise of the legislative veto with Jagdish Chadha's personal battle to avoid deportation
and obtain permanent resident status in the United States. The
book begins with Chadha's decision to leave his native Kenya and
begin undergraduate study at Bowling Green State University in
September, 1966. It ends with his reflections on his victory in the
Supreme Court and his eventual naturalization in 1984. Interwoven
with Chadha's story is a wider narrative about the litigation politics
of the legislative veto. Along the way, other dramatis personnae
make major appearances: former Representative Elliot Levitas, the
congressional protagonist of the legislative veto; Alan Morrison of
Public Citizen Litigation Group, Chadha's attorney before the
Supreme Court; and Larry Simms, organizer of opposition to the
legislative veto within the Justice Department. The book also includes detailed records of debates in Congress over the veto, and
above all there are descriptions of the strategies, testimony, arguments, briefs, and opinions in the court cases themselves.
Lucidly and stylishly written, this is nevertheless a serious and
comprehensive work, both the story of a celebrated case and a study
of an ill-fated innovation in legislative-executive relations. Craig explores the legal arguments at great length, and does not hesitate to
digress for didactic purposes-to explain to the lay reader theories
of constitutional interpretation or the role of the courts of appeal,
for example. The book is, in short, intended for a general audience,
but also valuable to specialists.
It is also a book of many felicities, serendipities, and excursions
fruitfully taken. Craig casts a good deal of light, for example, on
the advantages of group litigation and, conversely, on the helplessness of the lonely plaintiff and the inexperienced attorney. She also
documents once again the imperatives of public office as two presidential administrations, both sympathetic initially to the legislative
veto, came to realize its threat to the interests of the executive.
I have, however, two related reservations about this splendid
book. First, in Craig's account the case against the legislative veto
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overpowers the case for it. In part that imbalance results from the
book's emphasis on the perils of Jagdish Chadha. One finds oneself
cheering the arrival of the judicial cavalry to save a decent man
from deportation to a country (Great Britain) which he had never
known and of which he was not a citizen.
Related to that problem is a more fundamental one. Since this
is a study of litigation, it is cast largely in conventional legal categories. Accordingly, Craig treats the separation in terms that the
courts and popular myths have long favored: terms of encroachment and conflict rather than accommodation and compromise, of a
neat and discrete exercise of powers rather than an overlapping and
approximate one. The result is to load the case against the legislative veto in particular and more generally against adaptive views of
the separation.
Chadha may have been a good decision, but it was a closer case
than Craig suggests. Indeed, both the legislative veto and its demise
raise complex and troublesome questions about the nature and future of Congress. Put in traditional constitutional terms, the legislative veto is an aggrandizement of congressional power at the
expense of the equal and coordinate executive branch and an attempt to "pass" legislation without the required approval of the
president. In reality, of course, it is a sign of Congress's problems
and troubles-of its crowded and deadlocked agenda, of the increasingly complex demands of constituents and contributors, of its
inability to hold its own against both a media-based, imperial presidency and the regulators in executive agencies.
There is, in other words, a powerful political case for the legislative veto which is slighted here. It is a case one has to reckon
with, at least to understand why the legislative veto did not die with
Chadha.3 The truth is that Congress continues to pass legislative
vetoes and variants of legislative vetoes, and they remain in force
because it is in both branches' political interest to do so and not be
challenged. They survive because they are part of a grand bargain
in which Congress acquiesces in the vesting of greater and greater
discretionary authority in the hands of agencies in the executive
branch. They are, indeed, a part of the bargain that makes the administrative state of the late twentieth century politically acceptable
to the Congress.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Anthony Kennedy, disposed of Chadha on grounds that were un3. Readers who want to explore the survival of the legislative veto and its cousins post·
Chadha should consult Louis Fisher's richly authoritative article, Judicial .'lfisjudgments
About the Lawmaking Process: The Legis/ati•·e Veto Ca>e. 45 PLB. ADMI~. REV. 705 (1985).

434

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 6:431

characteristically narrow for a separation case: legislative encroachment on the judiciary's role in reviewing the adjudications of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. That ground, the
court acknowledged, left open the possibility that in other settings
the legislative veto might pass constitutional muster. It was precisely the kind of restrained decision that stamped Judge Kennedy
as an appropriate successor to Justice Powell.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, choosing instead to
strike down all legislative vetoes. Any legislative action taken by
Congress, wrote Chief Justice Burger, must conform to the constitutional requirements of bicameral passage and presentment to the
president:
Disagreement with the Attorney General"s decision on Chadha's deportation-that
is. Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress' original choice to
delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral
pa!>sage followed by presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked4

The majority thus swept aside possible distinctions among various
types of legislative vetoes. Chadha reflected the traditional and formal view of the separation.
Chadha also raises questions concerning the role of the Court
in interpreting the Constitution. Attorney General Meese tried to
rally American lawyers and judges around a standard of "original
intent;" it is but one of a number of interpretive theories (plain
meaning of the words, neutral principles, etc.) that seek to define a
limited judicial role. Most legal scholars have rejected Meesism in
favor of an interpretive stance that would reflect contemporary
meanings, that would address contemporary issues, that would keep
the text alive by contemporary standards-that would, in short, justify more expansionist interpretations and greater constitutional
change and adaptability in order to protect individual rights against
modern dangers and in light of modern values. The Bork hearings,
moreover, indicated that those views are very widely held. They
certainly seem to be held by most of the Justices, in practice if not
always in theory.
But just a minute. What about the need of the institutions established by the Constitution to adapt to twentieth-century demands and pressures? What of the problems of government itself as
it is transformed both by mass, popular democracy, and the weight
and power of the welfare state? Are we to live by an expansionist
interpretive creed for the Bill of Rights and by the narrow norm of
4.

INS v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919. 954-55 (1983).

1989]

BOOK REVIEWS

435

original intent for the rest of the Constitution? Do we promote constitutional health by accommodating change in what government
does without accommodating change in how it does it?
Of course, greater sophistication about the separation would
not necessarily entail disapproval of the result in Chadha; the legislative veto can be criticized on other, less formalistic grounds. Even
so, the formalism of the Chadha opinion may have affected the results in subsequent cases. To be sure, Chadha was not the first in
the recent spate of judicial invalidations of congressional acts based
(in at least substantial part) on the separation of powers; Buckley v.
Valeo,s for example, was an earlier decision. Chadha has been the
progenitor of the recent separation cases, perhaps because the issue
was much more central to its facts and judgment, and its offspring
show the same signs of a traditional, formal, conflict-centered view
of the separation as does Chadha.
Take, for instance, Bowsher v. Synar,6 the successful challenge
to the central role of the Comptroller General in the emergency
budget-cutting procedures of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Writing
for an eight-Justice majority, Chief Justice Burger settled the matter
in phrases of magisterial certitude: "The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that
Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control [i.e., the
Comptroller General] what it does not possess." 7 The separation,
thus understood, is remarkably clear, simple, and unreal. It ignores
all of the ways in which Congress does in fact participate in executing the laws-see the civil rights and voting rights acts of the
1960s-just as the delegation decisions have long ignored the extent
to which executive agencies exercise the very essence of legislative
powers.
After this explication of the separation, and a substantial obeisance to Chadha, Chief Justice Burger dismissed the policy reasons
for a permissive interpretation of the separation as mere arguments
of "convenience" and "efficiency." In Burger's analysis, all of the
issues of flexibility and change in a two hundred year old document
are seen as transitory, if not trivial, easily yielding to fundamental
principles.
The Supreme Court's decision in In reSealed Case,s upholding
the independent counsel ("special prosecutor"), may portend a
424 U.S. I ( 1976)
478 U.S 714 (1986).
7. /d. at 726.
8. In reSealed Case. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). n·•·"d sub. nom. Morrison v. Olson. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
5.
6.
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more flexible view of the separation. In any event, the parade of
separation issues will not stop. On June 13, 1988, the Court agreed
to decide the constitutionality of the new federal guidelines for sentencing convicted criminals, without waiting for appeals from district court cases to wend their ways through the courts of appeals. 9
At the time it granted jurisdiction, one newspaper estimated that
more than eighty federal district courts had held the rules unconstitutional while about sixty had ruled them constitutional.Io Many of
those eighty invalidated the guidelines because they believed that
the United States Sentencing Commission, which wrote them, was
composed in ways that violated the separation, either because Congress directed the president to include at least three federal judges
among the members of the Commission or because it delegated excessive and undirected power to it.
In short, we are in the very middle, the epicenter if you will, of
the greatest storm of constitutional litigation on the separation of
powers in the nation's two hundred years. After all, in the battles
over congressional delegations of rulemaking power in the 1930s,
the Court relied on separation grounds only twice. II Why then has
the separation now become so prominent in constitutional adjudication? Part of the explanation, perhaps, is the high tide of judicial
activism which has made it seem appropriate for the Court to settle
great issues of power and procedure. No doubt it also reflects the
long periods of control of Congress and the presidency by different
political parties. The Democrats have controlled at least one house
of Congress continuously for the two decades between 1968 and
1988, while the Republicans have held the presidency for sixteen of
the twenty years. From such basic political facts do great contentions arise; an interventionist Court has made them constitutional
issues.
For an introduction to all of this, Barbara Craig's Chadha is
warmly welcome. It describes the constitutional terrain and the
battles fought on it. It does so with a wealth of detail and color, and
with a firm grasp of the politics of constitutional litigation. But
these reportorial strengths are also the book's weaknesses. It plays
by the rules of the judicial forum and judicial rhetoric, and thus it
largely accepts the traditional judicial view of the separation-the
struggles and competitions among three completely separated
branches-and the assumptions and formalisms behind it. Craig's
9. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), aff'g Johnson v. United States,
682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.O. Mo. 1988).
10. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1988, at A24, col. 5.
II. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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purposes do not include a challenge to the traditional rhetoric or a
full explication of the realities of separation, the hard bargains of
wary accommodation between the branches, and the transformations wrought by the realities of positive government in an advanced industrial nation. By observing the tradition of formulaic
discourse on the separation, this book marks the extent to which
that tradition dominates our jurisprudence and the extent to which
we have become its willing prisoners.

LAW & LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION. By Richard A. Posner.I Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1989. Pp. 384. $25.00.
Lino A. Graglia 2
The stated purpose of this book is to "attempt a general survey
and evaluation of the field of law and literature." Judge Richard
Posner recognizes at the outset, however, that there is a substantial
question whether any such field of study can be meaningfully defined, any more so than, say, law and biology. Indeed, Judge Posner's main reason for assembling this group of disparate materials,
some previously published, seems to be to demonstrate that literary
criticism and literary theory really have very little to contribute to
the study and understanding of law-except perhaps to improve the
writing of judicial opinions. Even less surprisingly, he also concludes that legal scholars have little to contribute to the understanding and appreciation of literature.
Posner finds five important connections between law and literature. First, many literary works-for example, The Merchant of
Venice, Bleak House, The Brothers Karamazov, The Stranger, The
Trial, The Caine Mutiny-are about or at least involve law or legal
proceedings. "The legal matter in most literature," however, Posner concludes after examining several such works, "is peripheral to
the meaning and significance of the literature." A related conclusion is that "legal knowledge is often irrelevant to the understanding and enjoyment of literature on legal themes."
Second, and much more promising it might seem, literary
scholarship is like legal scholarship in that both are concerned with
I. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit.
2. A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law. University of Texas School of Law. Published
by permission of Transaction Publishers. from ACADEMIC QUESTIONS, Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1989. Copyright CD 1989 by the National Association of Scholars.

